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Section 1. Introduction 
 This paper provides an introduction to what is known about trends in international 
commodity market integration during the second half of the second millennium. Throughout, our 
focus is on intercontinental trade, since it is the emergence of large-scale trade between the 
continents which has especially distinguished the centuries following the voyages of da Gama 
and Columbus. This is by no means to imply that intra-European or intra-Asian trade was in any 
sense less significant It is simply a consequence of the limitations of space. 
 How should we measure integration? Traditional historians and modern trade economists 
tend to focus on the volume of trade, documenting the growth of trade along particular routes, or 
in particular commodities, or trends in total trade, or the ratio of trade to output. While such data 
are informative, and while we cite such data in this paper, ideally we would like to have data on 
the prices of identical commodities in separate markets. Commodity market integration implies 
that these prices should be converging over time; such price convergence will, other things being 
equal, drive up the volume of trade. However, the volume of trade could also increase for reasons 
unconnected with integration, or decline for reasons unconnected with disintegration: shifts in 
supply and demand will also lead to changes in trade flows, and these have no necessary 
connection with ‘globalization’.  
 Price convergence is thus the best measure of commodity market integration. Price gaps 
will reflect all relevant costs of doing trade between markets: not just transport costs, but also 
trade barriers, and those costs associated with wars, monopolies, pirates and so on. For the 19th 
and 20th centuries trade barriers and transport costs were the most important barriers to trade, and 
we have fairly detailed accounts of what happened to these, which we provide below. For earlier 
centuries, we have only limited information on these costs, as well on price gaps between 
markets; in addition, during the mercantilist era price gaps were as likely to be due to trade 
monopolies, pirates and wars as to transport costs and tariffs, which are more easily quantifiable. 
Thus, for the earlier period we rely more on qualitative information regarding trade routes, and 
quantity information regarding the volumes of commodities actually traded; for the later period 
we are able to switch to more systematic price-based evidence. We begin, however, with a brief 
description of the preconditions underlying the Voyages of Discovery. 
 
Section 2. World trade before 1500  
 Although it has become conventional to see the formation of the world economy as 
following in the aftermath of the European voyages of discovery in the late fifteenth century this 
should not be taken to imply that there was no relevant previous history. Columbus and da Gama 
were both motivated by the incentive to break the monopoly of the spice trade held by the rulers 
of Egypt and the Italian city-states, particularly Venice and Genoa. Thus we need to have some 
understanding of the structure and volume of this trade, at the very least. Both China and India, 
with their large populations relative to Europe, traded with Southeast Asia; and both engaged in 
the overland trade with Eastern Europe, the Islamic world and the Mediterranean. The Baltic 
trade was also of significance to both Northern and Eastern Europe. Shipping and nautical 
technology generally had also emerged through a complex interplay of several civilizations and 
economic systems. 
 There is also the question of incentives and capabilities in the determination of ‘who 
discovered whom?’ It was natural to assume that the Europeans were first across the seas because 
they were the first with the necessary technology. This comfortable Eurocentric assumption is 
belied by the voyages of the Ming admiral Zheng He in the first three decades of the 15th century. 
This shifts the question from technological capability to economic incentive. Findlay (1996), 
following Abu-Lughod (1989) and others, provides an outline of a complex pattern of linkages 
between wool from England and Spain, woolen cloth from Flanders and Italy, furs from Eastern 
Europe, gold from West Africa, cotton textiles and pepper from India, fine spices such as cloves 
and nutmeg from Southeast Asia and silk and porcelain from China that existed from at least a 
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thousand years ago. The Islamic world, stretching from the Atlantic to the Himalayas, and Sung 
China were the most advanced economic systems of that era with large cities, considerable 
manufacturing production and sophisticated monetary and credit systems. Western Europe, 
except for the Italian cities and Flanders, was a relatively backward agricultural area. 
  Despite the destruction unleashed during the process of its creation, the establishment of 
the Mongol Empire in the 13th century led to a unification of the Eurasian continent as a result of 
the ‘Pax Mongolica’ across Central Asia. As Joseph Needham (1954) and others have argued, 
perhaps without sufficient specificity, the ‘Pax Mongolica’ led to a significant transmission of 
ideas and techniques, along with an increased volume of goods and people. In addition, however, 
there was also the transmission of the deadly plague germs which resulted in the demographic 
catastrophe of the Black Death in the 1340s: this reduced the population of Europe and the 
Middle East by about a third. The reduced volume of production and trade led economic 
historians to speak of the centuries of the Renaissance in Europe as a time of economic 
depression. As several authors have pointed out, however, the plague raised per capita wealth, 
incomes and wage-rates, replacing a large but relatively stagnant European economy in 1340 that 
was already at its Malthusian limits with one that had two-thirds of the population but the same 
amount of land, capital and stock of precious metals in coins and bullion. The economic and 
monetary consequences of the Black Death are worked out by means of a general equilibrium 
model with endogenous population, capital and commodity money supply in Findlay and Lundahl 
(2000). Real wages rise, population slowly recovers driving real wages slowly down again, and 
an initial inflationary spike is followed by a long phase of deflation. The model postulates a 
demand for ‘Eastern luxuries’ that rises with the higher per capita wealth and income, leading to 
an increased outflow of precious metals to the East and hence a prolonged monetary contraction. 
Thus what Day (1978) called the ‘Great Bullion Famine of the Fifteenth Century’ can be 
explained as a consequence of the Black Death in the previous century. Eventually the model 
predicts a return to the initial long-run stationary equilibrium that prevailed before the onset of 
the Black Death, if all underlying behavioral relationships remain unchanged.  
 As Herlihy (1997) argues, however, the drastically altered circumstances of people’s 
lives would prompt alternatives in attitudes and institutions. The greater scarcity of labor would 
tend to dissolve feudal ties and stimulate labor-saving innovations, the higher per capita incomes 
could lead to postponement of the age at marriage in an effort to maintain the higher income 
levels, and so on. Furthermore, this period of increased incomes and a higher demand for Asian 
luxury goods coincided with the demise of the ‘Pax Mongolica’ and its associated overland trade, 
and a consequent reliance (once more) on traditional Indian ocean trade routes, and monopolistic 
Egyptian and Venetian intermediaries. Presumably this increased the incentive to find a sea route 
to Asia. The result of all these changed incentives could well be a more ‘modern’ society in 1450 
than in 1350, one which was ready to venture more readily and further abroad and so usher in a 
true era of globalization with the voyages of discovery linking all the continents by sea. 
 
Section 3. World trade 1500-1780 
Section 3.1. Introduction 
 This period opens with the European “Voyages of Discovery” across the Atlantic and 
around the Cape of Good Hope to the eastern seas, shortly followed by the crossing of the Pacific 
and the circumnavigation of the globe. The “globalization” of the world economy in the sense of 
the linking of markets in the Old and New Worlds that had hitherto been separated thus begins in 
this period, even if we have to wait until later for evidence of a “big bang” in terms of 
convergence in world product and factor prices. Thus Flynn and Giraldez (1995) are not 
necessarily only tongue in cheek when they date the “origin of world trade” to the year 1571 
when the city of Manila was founded, directly linking the trade of Europe, Asia, Africa and the 
Americas. However, with transport costs still high relative to production costs, long-distance 
trade was largely confined to commodities with a high ratio of value to weight and bulk, such as 
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spices, silk, silver and, last but not least, slaves. Nevertheless, the channels were laid along which 
the volume of world trade could grow later under the influence of technological change, capital 
accumulation and population growth. 
 The most momentous immediate consequence of the discoveries was the injection of 
large amounts of silver into the circuits of world trade, with the influx into Europe in particular 
leading to the so-called “Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century”. Within Europe the period 
was marked also by shifts in the locus of what Kindleberger (1996) calls “economic primacy”. 
The Iberian voyages led to a shift away from the earlier commercial dominance of Venice and the 
Italian cities, since the Cape route broke the monopoly shared by Venice and the rulers of Egypt 
on the spice trade through the Red Sea. The Portuguese were soon displaced however by the 
rising power of the Dutch, with Amsterdam, the “Venice of the North”, displacing the original 
one and its successor Antwerp. There followed the long struggle between the Dutch and the 
English East India Companies, the “multinational corporations” of that area. 
 Despite the prominence of European explorers, conquistadors and merchants during the 
earlier part of this period it is a profound historical mistake to imagine European dominance of 
the global economy as dating from soon after the original voyages. Ironically, the phrase “Vasco 
da Gama Epoch” was coined not by a European but by the nationalist Indian diplomat and 
historian K. M. Panikkar (1953). We must not forget that Constantinople fell to the Ottoman 
Turks shortly before da Gama was born and that the Safavids and Mughals established their rule 
in Persia and India before his death in the first case and shortly after it in the second. All three of 
these formidable “gunpowder empires” were involved in the network of world trade despite being 
essentially territorial powers, with dependence on imports of silver for their coinage being the 
most important link. Access to firearms and opportunities for greater revenue through taxing trade 
were also an important factor in strengthening native kingdoms throughout Southeast Asia as well 
as Japan. In the case of Ming China the introduction of the sweet potato, peanuts and other New 
World crops led to a substantial increase in agricultural productivity, stimulating population 
growth and the demand for imported silver and leading in turn to the export of tea, porcelain and 
silk (Ho 1959). 
 
Section 3.2. Trade after the Voyages of Discovery: qualitative trends 
 One way of thinking about the qualitative evolution of world trade over time is given in 
Mauro (1961), who presents an intriguing intercontinental matrix for world trade during this 
period, with the Americas separated into Tropical and Temperate Zones. The Voyages of 
Discovery, as well as those of Captain Cook, led to the emergence of trade flows between 
continents where previously there had been none; thus cells in the matrix which had been empty 
were no longer so. Second, once this had happened the range of goods being traded between 
continents began to expand, in response to declining transport costs, or shifts in demand and 
supply in the various regions of the world. The period from 1500 to 1780 was marked by a 
gradual evolution in the type of goods being traded. Originally the goods concerned were for the 
most part ‘non-competing’, in the sense that the trade was driven by the availability of 
commodities in some continents but not in others. Thus, Asia exported spices and silk, while the 
Americas exported silver. These goods had an extremely high value to bulk ratio, the high prices 
being due to the absence of local substitutes in destination markets. As the period progressed, 
bulkier commodities began to be shipped. Typically, these commodities were still only produced 
in particular continents (e.g. sugar and raw cotton), and only faced rather imperfect substitutes in 
destination markets (e.g. honey and wool). The great counter-example was India’s exports of 
cotton textiles, which accounted for more than half of the East India Company’s exports to 
Europe in the 1750s (Table 1). However, it was really only after the transport revolutions of the 
19th century that inter-continental trade began in homogenous bulk commodities which could be 
produced anywhere, such as wheat, iron and steel. 
 The discovery of the Cape route had an almost immediate impact on Venetian imports of 
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pepper and spices, but the effect was short-lived. Wake (1979, p.373) reports that pepper imports 
declined by 85% in 1501 over the average of the 1490’s and spices by 42%. Portuguese imports 
supplied half the European market in 1503-06 and much more a decade later (Wake 1979, p.381). 
However, the Portuguese never succeeded in their ambition to monopolize the pepper and spice 
trade.  As the 16th century progressed the Venetians and the overland trade fought back: in 1560 
they imported 2000 tons of pepper, more than they had imported in 1496 (Bulbeck et al. 1998, 
Table 3.2, pp. 72-3).1  Nor did the Voyages of Discovery lead to an immediate collapse in 
European pepper prices: instead, Figure 1 shows real pepper prices initially rising sharply, as the 
Portuguese disrupted traditional trade routes, and then rising for a second time in mid-century.2 
They then started to decline, especially during the 17th century, which saw the Portuguese 
displaced by the Dutch and English East India Companies. Imports into Europe increased 
substantially and prices fell to 30-40% below the prices maintained by the Portuguese in the 
previous century (Wake 1979, p. 389). While Venice had successfully competed with the 
Portuguese during the 16th century it could not survive the Anglo-Dutch competition in the first 
half of the 17th century. The annual consumption of pepper in Europe increased from about 3.4 
million lbs. in 1611 to 8.6 million lbs. in 1688, of which the Dutch supplied 4.00 and the English 
3.24 million lbs, (Wake 1979, p.391). 
 Pepper production and exports from Southeast Asia rose in response to the increased 
demand not only from Europe but also from China. Bulbeck et al. (1998, Table 3.7) indicate total 
exports from Southeast Asia increasing by a factor of 3.4 from the beginning to the end of the 16th 
century, by a further 50% to the end of the 17th century and by 20% more to the end of the 18th 
century, about sixfold from 1500-1800. The table also shows that the shares of Europe, China and 
“Other Regions” in total exports were stable at roughly one-third each over the entire period, 
despite considerable fluctuations between decades. Chinese emigrants from the southern 
provinces engaged in a vigorous expansion of cultivation in Southeast Asia during the 18th 
century, using innovative labor-intensive methods that raised yields per acre substantially. 
 Table 1 presents various estimates of the commodity composition of European imports 
between 1513 and 1780. European imports from Asia were initially dominated by pepper and 
other spices (nutmeg, mace, cloves and cinnamon), but over time the list of commodities being 
traded widened. Pepper, which accounted for well over half of imports from Asia in the sixteenth 
century (and which had initially accounted for more than 80% of Portuguese imports: Table 1, 
Panel A) declined sharply to less than 10% of Asian imports by the eighteenth. The Portuguese 
were importing textiles from Asia by the late 16th century; cotton textiles, mainly from India, 
made up 70-80% of British East India Company imports after 1660 and were the single most 
important import commodity for the Dutch as well after 1700 (Table 1, Panels B, C).  Tea and 
coffee were insignificant until they rose sharply around 1700, constituting a quarter of East India 
Company sales in Europe by the middle of the century. Despite this diversification, however, the 
Asian trade was still heavily concentrated in just a few items: pepper, fine spices, cotton textiles, 
tea and coffee constituted between 80 and 90% of imports from Asia throughout the period 
(Steensgaard 1995, p. 10). 
 By the middle of the eighteenth century, total colonial imports by England and the 
                                                          
1 Similarly, the new sea routes did not lead to the collapse of the traditional caravan trade across central 
Asia. To be sure, this trade did indeed eventually collapse in the late 16th and 17th centuries, but this was 
primarily due to political turmoil along the route. By contrast, caravan trade did prosper in the late 17th and 
18th centuries along a northern route (through southern Siberia and northern central Asia). This trade was 
conducted by Russian merchants and took place within Russian territory until the merchants reached China 
itself (Rossabi 1990).  
2 These are the European pepper price series given in Bulbeck et al. 1998, p. 70, deflated by the average 
Valencian price level calculated in Hamilton (1934). 
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Netherlands combined were valued at 32 million pesos, about equally divided between Asia and 
the Americas (Table 1, Panel D). Quantification of imports from America is more difficult, since 
this trade was not dominated by a few large companies for long periods of time, as was the case 
in Asia (Steensgaard 1995, p. 11). The most important non-monetary import was sugar: total 
European imports of sugar were 170,000 metric tons by about 1750, ten times the level of the 
early seventeenth century, according to Steensgaard (1995, p.12). Sugar accounted for roughly 
50% of Europe’s imports from America, with the remainder being evenly divided between 
tobacco and miscellaneous items. 
 Initially, however, the most important European import from the New World, in terms of 
its economic consequences, was silver. Table 2 reproduces the data given in Barrett (1990) on 
flows of silver from the Americas to Europe and Asia, as well as on European exports of silver. 
American production rose for every quarter-century over this period, from an annual average of 
45 tons in 1501-1525 to 340 tons in 1601-1625, 550 tons in 1701-1725 and 940 tons in 1776-
1800. Europe imported almost 90% of this output in the early 16th century, but the proportion 
shipped to Europe fell over time, reflecting increased retention within the Americas: the figure 
hovered between 70% and 80% during most of the period. Some part of silver production in the 
New World was exported by the Acapulco galleons across the Pacific to Manila. However, the 
annual average flow was around 15 tons for most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It 
was thus relatively insignificant compared to the estimates for the export of American silver 
through Europe.  
 What happened to the silver which Europe imported? Europe’s deficit on imports of 
Indonesian spices, Chinese porcelain, silk and tea and Indian cotton textiles was largely paid for 
by American silver drained from Spain: exports from Europe rose from 100 tons in 1601-1625 to 
nearly double a century later, after which they flattened out.3 These calculations clearly show 
that the Asian trade of the companies would have been impossible without access to the bullion supplies of 
the New World to finance the gap between the invoice value of imports and exports of goods and services 
(the value of remittances). The gross profit margin (ratio to invoice value of sales) was huge at over 125%, 
roughly the same for both companies while net profits were estimated by Steensgaard at about 13% for the 
English and 10% for the Dutch company. These net profit figures indicate that the companies were not in 
any way exceptionally profitable, contrary to the implication by Wallerstein (1980), for example, that vast 
profits were extracted by the “core” from the “periphery”. On the other hand, retention within Europe 
also rose, from 145 tons in 1601-1625 to 225 tons in 1701-1725 and over 400 tons in the last 
quarter of the eighteenth century. Indeed, Europe absorbed an increasing proportion of the 
American shipments over the period (from around 60% at the start of the 17th century to almost 
70% at the end of the 18th) despite the wide-spread allegation that China and India had a 
supposedly irrational desire to “hoard” specie unproductively. Since bullion formed the “high-
powered” money of the period these figures indicate the extent of monetization in Europe and 
Asia. The impact on Europe of this monetary expansion continues to be a hotly debated issue, and 
its possible ramifications as far afield as Ottoman Turkey, Mughal India and Ming China have 
also been examined. Despite its turbulence, the sixteenth century was almost everywhere an age 
of monetary, economic and demographic expansion, while the seventeenth has been associated 
with a famous “Crisis”, first identified by Hobsbawm (1954), during which growth stagnated and 
prices fell. Here again the phenomenon was first debated in a European context but was later 
                                                          
3  Steensgaard (1995, Table 2) presents a calculation of the values of exports, imports and profits of the two 
East India Companies, expressed as annual averages for the 1740-45 period. Total exports were 6.1 million 
pesos, while the sales value of imports was 12.8 million pesos, compared with an invoice value of 5.7 
million pesos, leaving a gross profit of 7.1 million pesos. Dividends were 1.3 million with 5.8 million left 
over to cover all costs other than the invoice value of imports. The exports of 6.1 million pesos break down 
into only 1.2 million for commodity exports while exports of treasure (mainly silver) were over half the 




extended to the global stage, as in Parker and Smith (1978) and later work. 
 Another important source of silver, and also copper, in this period was Japan. Everyone is 
familiar with the idea of a secluded island forced open to world commerce by Commodore Perry 
in 1853; but there was a period (roughly from 1560 to 1640) when Japan was actively involved in 
world trade, both directly and indirectly, during which Portuguese and Dutch contacts played a 
major intermediary role between Japan on the one hand and China and Southeast Asia on the 
other. Silver exports to China and Southeast Asia were made through the Ryukyu Islands and also 
through the Dutch East India Company in exchange for Chinese silk and other products. The 
Company in turn used the silver thus obtained for the purchase of pepper and spices in the 
Indonesian archipelago, and for cotton textiles in India for eventual shipment to Europe. Barrett 
(1990, Table 7.4, p. 246) reports that Japan exported an average of between 34 and 49 tons per 
year to China between 1560 and 1599, and between 150 and 187 tons per year between 1600 and 
1640. 
 Portugal first obtained a lucrative foothold in Japan when the Ming in 1557 banned trade 
with Japan because of the depredations of Japanese pirates along the southern coasts. Japanese 
merchants were eager to maintain supplies of raw and woven silk and other Chinese and 
Southeast Asian products, which they attempted to obtain from Chinese sources through 
Formosa, the Philippines and Indo-China. With Chinese merchants and emigrants established in 
Southeast Asian ports the Ming ban on trade with China was effectively circumvented. The 
Portuguese took the opportunity to purchase large quantities of silk and other products at their 
base in Macau, with silver from the Americas, which they then exchanged in Japan for silver at 
better prices, in effect profiting by arbitraging the silk-silver price differential between China and 
Japan at a rate of 70-80% according to Iwao (1976, p.6) 
 The unification of the country in the second half of the sixteenth century by the great 
warlord Hideyoshi after a century of civil war led to a boom in economic activity. In particular 
the output of Japanese silver mines increased greatly because of a new smelting technology 
introduced by Korean miners in western Japan. Large amounts of silver came to be exported in 
return for greatly expanded imports of raw silk, which jumped fourfold according to Iwao (1976, 
p.4). Hideyoshi maintained a privileged position for himself in the regulated trade with the 
Portuguese and the Spanish, having first claim on all the imports that they brought into the 
country. Lead ingots for ammunition was an important imported item, with firearms copied from 
Portuguese models being produced on the island of Tanegashima. After 1600 the new Tokugawa 
shogun continued the policy of regulated trade through the port of Nagasaki. At the same time the 
Tokugawa permitted licensed ships, the so-called “vermilion-seal” ships, to trade with Southeast 
Asia, effectively reducing the monopoly power of the Portuguese in raw silk imports. Iwao (1976, 
p.10) states that in all about 350 of these ships left Japan in the thirty-year period between the 
inception and cessation of the policy around 1640. Again the main commodity exported was 
silver in return mostly for raw silk but other products such as deerskins as well. Iwao (1976, p.10) 
claims that Japan exported 130-160 thousand kilograms of silver over the period 1615-1625, or as 
much as 30 to 40 per cent of world silver production outside Japan. The ships that carried the 
silver were Japanese, Chinese, Dutch and Portuguese vessels. 
 The Dutch enjoyed a complete monopoly of Western trade with Japan after 1640, since 
they were able to persuade the Shogun that the Catholic powers were intent on subverting his 
regime through proselytization by the Jesuits. The Japanese silver influx to Batavia between 1630 
and 1680 was at least a third of the total inflow to the company from all sources according to de 
Vries and van der Woude (1997, Table 9.5). The Japanese bonanza increased the total trade 
revenue and net surplus over expenses very much over the 1630-1650 period, (ibid., Table 9.4), 
and raised the profit rate for the company from its inception to 1650 to as high as 27% per annum 
(ibid., p. 396). 
 Japanese silver production and exports both declined during the close of the 17th century 
as the seclusion policy of the Tokugawa took hold. China continued to obtain silver through 
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imports but now the source was increasingly from the Americas through Manila (von Glahn 
1996, Table 5). 
 
Section 3.3. Government policy 
             The role of government policy in relation to trade during the 1500-1780 period was a 
very active one. It’s character, however, was very different from what we have become familiar 
with in more recent times. Tariff policy for protective purposes, which we assume today to be the 
standard form of trade intervention, was not then of major importance. Customs duties according 
to Davis(1966, p.306),revealed “the influence neither of economists’ theories nor of ministers’ 
long-term commercial policies, but simply of urgent fiscal needs”. Many high customs duties 
were on non-competing imports such as tea, for example, giving rise to lucrative opportunities for 
smuggling. More ambitious interventions, such as the ill-fated ‘Cockayne project’ to convert 
exports of raw wool into woollen cloth to increase domestic value-added and employment, 
succeeded only in disrupting trade before they were abandoned. 
              Government policy during this ‘Age of Mercantilism’, was geared to the active 
promotion of positive trade balances by the establishment of chartered monopolies and the 
acquisition of overseas colonies as sources of raw materials and profitable re-exports and markets 
for manufactures from the mother country. As Wilson(1949) and others have convincingly argued 
the emphasis on obtaining specie was not irrational if it provided the means for obtaining 
strategic imports such as naval stores from the Baltic and Oriental wares such as tea and muslin 
for re-export to other European markets. Viner(1948), in a classic formulation, pointed out that 
the ‘power’ of the state.(primarily naval), was used to obtain ‘plenty’ through trade, which could 
be taxed in turn to finance the sources of power. The history of the Anglo-Dutch wars of the 
seventeenth century and the Anglo-French wars of the eighteenth illustrate the links between 
commercial and geopolitical factors exemplified by Viner’s analysis. 
 The wars on the continent of Europe involving France, Prussia and Austria were over 
territorial acquisition and dynastic aggrandizement. These became intertwined however with 
commercial conflicts in the New World and India, leading some to speak of the Seven Years War 
from 1756-1763 as the first ‘world’ war. The bonanza opened up by the Iberian voyages of 
discovery led to a series of sustained conflicts between their predatory successors that was not to 
be resolved until the triumph of Britain at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. It is only within a 
framework such as this that we can obtain a proper perspective on the plethora of monopoly 
rights, navigation acts, bounties drawbacks, prohibitions and blockades that constituted trade 
policy during the Age of Mercantilism. Needless to say such an attempt, fascinating as it would 
be, is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Section 3.4. Trade after the Voyages of Discovery: quantitative trends 
 O’Rourke and Williamson (2001, Table 1) assemble an extensive range of published 
estimates for particular channels of trade for the past five centuries and compute growth rates of 
world trade for each of them. The results show that intercontinental trade grew at 1.26% per 
annum in the 16th century, and that growth fell to 0.66% per annum in the 17th century before 
rising back to 1.26% per annum in the 18th century. The growth rate for the entire 1500-1800 
period was 1.06% per annum. Though this may look small to modern eyes it was certainly well 
ahead of the growth rate of world population during this period, which increased from 461 
million in 1500 to 954 million in 1800, or at a rate of 0.24% per annum. While we do not have 
data it is highly unlikely that intercontinental trade as a whole grew faster than world population 
for any previous century; in this sense, the post-1500 period does mark a clear break with the 
past. Similarly, the qualitative evidence assembled above regarding the development of new trade 
routes, especially across the Atlantic, the growing volume of trade in particular commodities over 
those routes, and changing patterns of comparative advantage, also suggests that 1500 marked an 
important turning point in the history of world trade. 
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 Nonetheless, the best measure of international commodity market integration remains 
international price convergence. Figure 2 plots markups for cloves, pepper and coffee (O’Rourke 
and Williamson 2000, based on Bulbeck, Reid, Tan and Wu 1998), where markups are defined as 
the ratio of European to Asian price. There is plenty of evidence of price convergence for cloves 
from the 1590s to the 1640s, but it was short-lived, since the spread soared to a 350-year high in 
the 1660s, maintaining that high level during the VOC monopoly and up to the 1770s. The clove 
price spread fell steeply at the end of the French Wars, and by the 1820s was one-fourteenth of 
the 1730s level. This low spread was maintained across the 19th century. Between the 1620s and 
the 1730s, the pepper price spread showed no trend, after which, however, it soared to a 250-year 
high in the 1790s. By the 1820s, the pepper price spread of the early 17th century was recovered, 
and price convergence continued up to the 1880s, when the series ends. While there is some 
modest evidence of price convergence for coffee during the half century between the 1730s and 
the 1780s, everything gained was lost and more during the French Wars. At the war’s end, price 
convergence resumed, so that the coffee price spread in the 1850s was one-sixth of what it had 
been in the 1750s, and in the 1930s it was one-thirteenth of what it had been in the 1730s. Thus, 
there is absolutely no evidence of commodity price convergence for these “exotic” goods so 
central to Dutch trade. Was English trade in Asia any different than Dutch trade? Apparently not. 
Figure 3 plots the average prices received by the East India Company on its Asian textile sales in 
Europe, divided by the average prices it paid for those textiles in Asia. Again, there is no sign of 
declining mark-ups (where mark-ups include all trade costs, as well as any East India Company 
monopoly profits) over the century between 1664 and 1769. Figure 5 in O’Rourke and 
Williamson (2000) reproduces Chaudhuri’s mark-up figures for the East India Company’s trade 
in pepper, saltpetre, tea, raw silk, coffee, and indigo, between about 1660 and 1710. With the 
possible exception of saltpetre, it would be very hard to establish a convincing case that mark-ups 
were declining during this fifty-year period. 
 Of course, these price spread were not driven solely, or even mainly, by the costs of 
shipping, but rather, and most importantly, by monopoly, international conflict, and government 
tariff and non-tariff restrictions. For example, for pepper the mark-up in Figure 2 was relatively 
stable at between three and six over the entire period, reflecting relatively competitive conditions 
in the pepper market. Where the Dutch were able to secure a monopoly, as with the cloves of the 
Spice Islands and the cinnamon of Ceylon, this ratio could become enormous, reaching 25 around 
1640 for cloves and remaining at about 15 for the next century.4 Nonetheless, anything that 
impedes price convergence suppresses trade, and there is no evidence of secular, intercontinental 
commodity price convergence before the 1820s. Nor have scholars such as Menard (1991) 
uncovered much evidence of transport revolutions during this period (O’Rourke and Williamson 
2000). What then drove the unprecedented growth in world trade in the three centuries following 
Columbus? Outward shifts in export supply and import demand, is the answer suggested by 
O’Rourke and Williamson (2001), who estimate that between 50% and 65% of the boom could 
have been due to European income growth alone. 
 
Section 3.5. The economic impact of world trade: economic primacy within Europe 
 Economic geography models typically ask what the impact of international integration is 
on the relative welfare of core and periphery. One of the most notable features of this period of 
globalization, however, was a change in the location of the core itself; and such changes were 
intimately linked with the changing nature of international trade. In the case of Western Europe 
                                                          
4 The competition in the 17th century between the two great rival companies has been elegantly analyzed in 
terms of the Brander-Spencer duopoly model of strategic trade policy by Irwin (1991). He demonstrates the 
advantage of the Dutch institutional form in which the decision-makers obtained not only a share of the 
profit but also of gross revenue. 
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the Discoveries were said to have induced a shift in the main locus of economic activity from the 
Mediterranean to the Atlantic, as exemplified by the rise of Antwerp, Amsterdam, Seville, Lisbon 
and London relative to Venice and Genoa. This makes one think of intercontinental trade as 
displacing intra-European trade, and therefore illustrating a dramatic early instance of the 
importance of “globalization”. This claim is disputed, however: according to Rapp (1975), “it was 
the invasion of the Mediterranean, not the exploitation of the Atlantic, that produced the Golden 
Ages of Amsterdam and London”. Production and marketing innovations in English woolen 
textiles and Dutch improvements in shipping, as well as growing dependence of southern Europe 
on northern grain imports were important factors in shifting “economic primacy” away from the 
south to Holland and England before the trade with Asia and the New World grew sufficiently in 
importance. In the 1660s almost half of London’s total exports were to the Mediterranean, 
compared with only 9% to the Americas and 6% to Asia (Davis 1962).5 
 The discoveries can be looked upon as creating the prospect for a “new global economy”, 
displacing traditional trade routes and centers. As with the “new economy” of today it was not 
clear who the eventual “winners” were to be. The Portuguese were the pioneers and Spain 
controlled the territories in the New World but neither of the Iberian states had the commercial 
and organizational capacity to fully exploit the opportunities that were opened up. Thus Portugal 
found it necessary from as early as 1501 to use Antwerp as the emporium through which she 
would dispose of the spices obtained from the East. Antwerp also attracted the woolen cloth of 
England, silver, copper and financial capital from South Germany and many other items of 
European and colonial trade. The city grew rapidly in population to over 100,000 by the 1560s 
and could rightly be considered the first truly global emporium, with a range and diversity of 
commodities vastly exceeding that of Venice, Bruges and other earlier commercial centers. 
Despite its wealth and splendor, however, Israel (1989) argues that Antwerp was too passive to be 
a truly dynamic center of world trade, with no active involvement in creating and attracting 
business towards itself. Its dominance did not last long and the peak was passed before it 
succumbed to the depredations of the Spanish armies in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. 
Her entrepreneurs and skilled craftsmen mostly fled to the United Provinces, benefiting the rival 
that was to supplant her, Amsterdam.  
 The Dutch “golden age” is usually taken to begin from about 1590 and lasted until about 
1740, with a peak in the second half of the seventeenth century. Maddison (1991, p.31) states that 
Dutch income per head in 1700 was around 50% higher than in Britain, with the shares of 
industry and services in total employment substantially higher. He also cites Gregory King as 
estimating the Dutch saving rate to be 11% in 1688 as compared with 4% for Britain and France. 
The volume of international trade was approximately the same as in Britain, which meant that it 
was five times as high per capita.  How a country whose population never exceeded two million 
during these years could have led the world economy for so long has been a never-ending source 
of wonder and controversy among historians down to the present day. Geography provides part of 
the answer: the foundations were laid by taking advantage of location, midway between the Bay 
of Biscay and the Baltic. Seville and Lisbon and the Baltic ports were too far apart for direct trade 
between the two terminal points, enabling the Dutch to provide profitable intermediation, 
carrying salt, wine and cloth and later silver, spices and colonial products eastwards while 
bringing Baltic grains, fish and naval stores to the west. The Dutch share of European shipping 
tonnage was enormous, well over half during most of the period of their ascendancy. With such a 
small population this concentration on trade, shipping and manufacture required reliance on 
imported grain, most of which was from the Baltic regions. The urban population was over half of 
                                                          
5 Subsequently, however, intercontinental trade grew in absolute and relative importance. The share of 
colonial commodities in the total imports of London rose from practically nil in 1600 to 24% in 1660 and to 
46% of total English imports in 1750.  
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the total, with the fifty-seven cities of the seven United Provinces making it one of the most 
densely populated parts of Europe. The Calvinistic ethic promoted thrift and education, with the 
lowest interest rates and the highest literacy rates in Europe. The abundance of capital made it 
possible to maintain an impressive stock of wealth, embodied not only in the large fleet but in the 
plentiful stocks of an array of commodities that were used to stabilize prices and take advantage 
of profit opportunities. The grading, sorting and packaging of goods provided the essential 
services of a commercial “hub”. 
 In comparison with the larger European states the Dutch offset their inferiority in 
numbers with a concentration on commerce and finance that the others could not match, 
distracted as they were by dynastic ambitions and other rivalries. While Amsterdam and Holland 
were undoubtedly the leaders the other provinces and cities cooperated in their own interest. 
Unlike Antwerp, which was a dependency of the Habsburgs, Amsterdam and the United 
Provinces were fiercely independent, carrying on a long and successful military struggle against 
their erstwhile masters the Habsburgs, while continuing to trade with them to obtain silver and 
other necessities for the operation of their global commercial system. War and trade were 
inseparable in the Age of Mercantilism, and the Dutch excelled at both, particularly at sea. 
 There has been an ongoing historical controversy about the “modernity” of the Dutch 
Republic in the seventeenth century. Identifying modernity with the Industrial Revolution, writers 
such as Braudel, Hobsbawm and Wallerstein have stressed continuities with past patterns of trade 
and commercial organization, such as Dutch experience with the bulk trade of the Baltic in the 
case of Braudel, as opposed to any innovative departures. As against this Israel (1989), de Vries 
and van der Waude (1997) and Steensgaard (1982) have emphasized the originality of the Dutch 
in creating new institutions and practices to take advantage of the new opportunities opened up by 
the prospect of intercontinental trade. Steensgaard (1982) convincingly demonstrates how the 
fusion of public and private interests in creating a large and growing fund of “permanent, 
anonymous capital” that internalized protection costs while maintaining a steady annual dividend 
of 12.5% made the Dutch East India Company of the seventeenth century a truly revolutionary 
global organization. De Vries and van der Waude (1997) are also convincing in entitling their 
splendid work on the Dutch economy from 1500-1815 “The First Modern Economy” since as 
they say “the harbors of the Republic were in direct and continuous contact with Dutch 
settlements stretching from New Amsterdam and Curacao in the west to Formosa and Nagasaki in 
the east, and from Smeerenburg on Spitzbergen in the north to Capetown at the southern tip of 
Africa” (p.376). 
 
Section 3.6. The economic impact of world trade: trade and the Industrial Revolution 
 The Industrial Revolution that got underway in Britain in the late 18th century 
undoubtedly ushered in a new era in the evolution of the world economy, and confirmed the 
emergence of Britain as the dominant world economic power. As Wrigley (1988) has 
emphasized, the use of coal and other fossil fuels radically altered the constraints on the world’s 
energy supplies. Until the 18th century even major technical innovations in Europe and Asia 
raised living standards only temporarily, until they were whittled down by induced population 
growth. Improvements could be made in specialization and the division of labor, and population 
growth held in check by such factors as the delay of marriages, but ultimately there was always a 
limit. This is what Wrigley (1988) called the “advanced organic economy” that can exhibit only 
“Smithian” growth, as opposed to the “mineral-based energy economy” that can exhibit 
“Schumpeterian” growth, continuously raising per capita incomes as a result of incessant 
technical change, accompanied by a demographic revolution that reduces fertility rates to 
maintain the higher per capita incomes. 
  If silver was the main commodity in the Atlantic trade of the 17th century there is little 
doubt that the slave trade and its ramifications dominated that of the 18th century. Africa’s 
participation in the world economy, long confined to the almost-legendary “golden trade of the 
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Moors”, grew to major proportions with the expansion of sugar, tobacco and cotton cultivation in 
the New World on slave plantations. The 18th century accounted for about two-thirds of the total 
transfer of 9-10 million persons over the entire history of the trade from its inception around 1450 
to its abolition in the 19th century. The last two decades of the 18th century in particular saw a 
surge in slave imports in response to the cotton boom triggered by the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain. 
 This pattern of relationship in the international trade of the Atlantic gave rise to the 
celebrated thesis of Eric Williams (1944) that the profits of the slave trade spurred the Industrial 
Revolution. This argument was heavily criticized by several prominent historians but 
sympathetically treated by William A. Darity, Barbara L. Solow and Findlay (1990), who 
provides the relevant references as well as a simple general-equilibrium model of the “triangular 
trade” between Europe (largely Britain), Africa and the New World. Patrick K. O’Brien and 
Stanley L. Engerman (1991) are also somewhat receptive to the William Thesis, after having been 
among its most prominent critics in earlier work. For a current review and references, see Morgan 
(2000). 
 A more general issue is the question of the role of foreign trade as a whole in relation to 
the origin and sustainability of the Industrial Revolution. The growing importance of international 
trade for the British economy is indicated by the rise in the share of exports in national income 
from 8.4% in 1700 to 14.6% in 1760 and 15.7% in 1801 (Crafts 1985, Table 6.6). Even more 
interesting is the shift in the geographical distribution of British trade reported by Davis (1962). 
North America, Africa and the West Indies took 12% of exports and provided 20% of retained 
imports in 1700, with these shares rising to 60% of exports and 32% of imports.6 Thus the 
“triangular trade” grew faster than total trade, which in turn grew faster than national income. 
Findlay (1982) considered a model in which a discrete but substantial technical innovation in the 
export sector is responsible for the initial spurt, rather than an exogenous shift in foreign demand. 
The apparent deterioration of Britain’s terms of trade in the aftermath of the original spurt is 
consistent with this “supply-side” explanation; however, it may be that the existence of wide and 
growing foreign markets made it possible for the impulse from technological change in the export 
sector not to be choked off by too sharp a decline in relative prices. 
 The triangular trade model in Findlay (1990) also predicts an expansion of demand for 
raw cotton imports into Britain and of slaves to the Americas as a consequence of the innovation 
in Manchester in the 1780s. There is abundant evidence for both, together with improvements in 
the terms of trade for the newly independent United States, where cotton was the main export, 
and also for the slave-exporting kingdoms on the west coast of Africa. One further interesting 
aspect of the intercontinental complex was the role of Indian cotton textiles. These were a major 
import of the East India Company, sold to Britain itself and re-exported to Africa in payment for 
slaves. Ultimately Lancashire, with its raw cotton imports from the slave plantations of the New 
World, displaced the long-standing Indian cotton textile industry, leading to the sad fate of the 
handloom weavers of Bengal. “Globalization” was thus fully at work at the turn of the 18th 
century to the 19th century, with both positive and negative consequences in all four continents. 
 
 
Section 4. The French and Napoleonic Wars   
 The previous sections have documented the growth and maturation of a well-defined 
global economy encompassing not just Europe and Asia, but Africa and the Americas as well. 
However, progress towards greater economic integration had been periodically impeded by war, 
as various European nations struggled for supremacy. This was not a new phenomenon: for 
                                                          
6 Esteban (1997) presents valuable evidence on the rising share of manufactured exports to industrial output 
in Britain from 1700 to 1851. 
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example, Russell Menard (1991, pp. 240-243) finds a three-fold increase in freight charges on the 
English-Continental wine trade during the 14th century, due to the onset of the Hundred Years 
War. Figure 2 indicates increases in clove and pepper markups during the 1650s and 1660s, 
coinciding with the first and second Anglo-Dutch Wars (1652-54 and 1665-67); and the spike in 
the clove mark-up during the 1750s coincides with the outbreak of the Seven Years War (1756-
63). Even more noticeable are the increases in mark-ups during the 1790s, coinciding with the 
outbreak of what have become known as the French and Napoleonic Wars. On February 1st, 1793 
the French National Convention declared war on Great Britain. The ensuing period of warfare, 
which lasted almost uninterrupted until 1815, had profound and long-lasting effects on 
international trade. 
 Within a month, the Convention had prohibited the importation of large classes of British 
goods, and in October it banned all British manufactured goods; meanwhile, the British side 
adopted a policy of blockading the coast of France. As Eli Heckscher’s classic account 
emphasizes (Heckscher 1922), each side was motivated by a mercantilist desire to prevent the 
other exporting, and thus acquiring precious metals, rather than by a desire to prevent the other 
side importing food or other goods which might be useful to the war effort.7 In addition, both the 
French and the British took measures against neutral shipping which transported enemy goods, 
but trade disruption was to become far more widespread in the aftermath of Napoleon’s military 
victories over Austria in 1805 and Prussia in 1806. In November 1806, his Berlin Decree declared 
that the British Isles were under blockade (somewhat fancifully, since Britain controlled the seas); 
he also began applying these restrictions, not just in France, but in vassal states such as Spain, 
Naples and Holland. The result was that virtually the entire Continent was now in a state of ‘self-
blockade’ against the exports of Britain, the overwhelmingly dominant industrial power of the 
time.8 In November 1807 the British declared that neutral ships could be seized if found to be 
carrying goods from enemy colonies directly to their mother countries; Napoleon retaliated by 
declaring that any neutral ship putting into a British port was fair prize, and could be seized. 
Faced with a situation where neutral ships carrying colonial goods to the Continent were now 
subject to seizure from either one side or the other, the US government closed its ports in 
December to belligerent shipping and forbade its own ships to leave these ports.  
 This Embargo Act was repealed in 1809, and replaced with a non-Intercourse Act which 
only banned trade with Britain and France (and which was clearly difficult to enforce, once ships 
had been given leave to sail to Europe). Russia broke with France in 1810; by 1813 Napoleon was 
in retreat and the Continental Blockade was unraveling in several directions; and the Blockade 
legislation was finally repealed following Napoleon’s abdication in 1814. Nonetheless, for over 
20 years leading governments had acted so as to severely disrupt international trade, and under 
the Continental System that disruption had been widespread and rather extreme. Did these 
measures seriously impede the integration of international commodity markets, or were they so 
undermined by smuggling, corruption and fiscally-motivated legal exceptions to the general 
protectionist rule as to have had no significant effect? 
 The literature on these issues is sparse, and to a large effect relies on qualitative evidence, 
or quantity data, rather than the price data which we really need. In a classic article, François 
Crouzet (1964) drew attention to the disruptive effects of the wars on Continental industry. The 
sea blockade by the British Royal Navy affected Atlantic-oriented export activities severely: ship 
building, rope-making, sail-making, sugar refining, and the linen industry all suffered. Industrial 
                                                          
7 The exception being that food exports were occasionally banned when domestic food supplies were 
scarce. 




activity shifted from the Atlantic seaboard to the interior, as import-substituting industries such as 
cotton textiles flourished behind the protection from British competition afforded by the 
Continental System. The gains to interior regions such as Alsace were mirrored by the population 
loss in coastal cities such as Amsterdam, Bordeaux and Marseilles. Naturally, Continental 
industries which had prospered under these wartime circumstances were unlikely to favor 
peacetime moves towards free trade; the effects of the war-time shock were thus to prove quite 
persistent, with path-dependence being induced by the political process. 
 Jeffrey Frankel (1982) has produced more price-based evidence speaking to the issue of 
how Jefferson’s Embargo Act affected trade and welfare in the US and Britain during 1808 and 
early 1809. In 1807, the Liverpool price of cotton was 27.5% higher than the Charleston price; in 
the final two months of the embargo, the Liverpool price was 293.3% higher than the Charleston 
price (Frankel 1982, pp. 307-8). Using prices for a number of key agricultural and industrial 
commodities, Frankel found that the British terms of trade deteriorated by between 41.9% and 
49.7% during the dispute, while the US terms of trade deteriorated by between 31.6% and 32.7% 
(Frankel 1982, p. 304). The smaller impact on the US economy was largely due to its success in 
developing import-substituting industries in states such as Pennsylvania. As in the French case, 
these new industries and their home states would form the basis of a powerful protectionist lobby 
in the years ahead, yet another example of politically-induced hysteresis. 
 By how much did the wars increase the costs of trade between Britain and the Continent? 
According to Thomas Tooke, it cost between 30 and 50 shillings per quarter to ship wheat from 
the Baltic to Britain in 1810, as compared with 4s/6d in 1837.9 Glenn Hueckel has estimated that 
wartime freight, insurance and licence costs accounted for between 25% and 40% of British 
wheat prices in 1812, and that over the period 1790-1815, wartime disruption raised the relative 
price of agricultural commodities in Britain by 28% (Hueckel 1973, pp. 369, 389). Not 
surprisingly, this raised landowners’ incomes significantly (Hueckel 1973, Williamson 1984), and 
equally unsurprisingly, British landowners tried to hold onto those gains after the war by means 
of strict protection. 
 It seems as though the Napoleonic Wars not only managed to disrupt the workings of 
international commodity markets in the years before 1815; in France and the US the hothouse 
protection afforded by war created import-substituting industries which would require continuing 
protection for their survival. The resulting emergence of powerful protectionist constituencies 
would ensure that the road to free trade in the 19th century would not be as universal or as smooth 
as is sometimes supposed. North-South conflict over tariff policy would be a feature of American 
politics for decades to come; Crouzet (1964, p. 588) goes so far as to speculate that the 
instinctively interventionist French attitude towards protection evident at the time he was writing 
(the early 1960s) might be traced back to these long run political effects of the Napoleonic Wars. 
 Moreover, in Britain the Corn Laws survived until 1846. When Europe eventually moved 
towards freer trade in the late 19th century, this was largely as a result of Britain’s example; might 
Britain have liberalized earlier had the Napoleonic Wars not intervened? Such an argument 
assumes that industrialization would have led to the emergence of powerful export interests, 
which would have eventually triumphed as their political power grew. Would the extension of the 
franchise favoring urban interests have predated the 1832 Reform Act, in the absence of war? 
Alternatively, might landlords have diversified into non-agricultural interests earlier, and been 
coopted by the free trade side as eventually happened (Schonhardt-Bailey 1991)? Did the 
Napoleonic Wars delay the advent of free trade in Britain and Europe, by as much as several 
decades? We confess that we do not know the answers to these important questions. 
 
                                                          
9 Cited in Hueckel (1973), p. 369. 
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Section 5. World trade 1815-1914 
5.1. The  world-wide 19th century decline in transport costs10 
 Although canals also made an important contribution to commodity market integration 
(Slaughter 1995), steamships were the most important 19th century contribution to shipping 
technology. In the first half of the century, steamships were mainly used on important rivers, the 
Great Lakes, and inland seas such as the Baltic and the Mediterranean. A regular trans-Atlantic 
steam service was inaugurated in 1838, but until 1860 steamers mainly carried high-value goods 
similar to those carried by airplanes today, like passengers and mail (Cameron 1989, p. 206). As 
late as 1874, steamships carried 90 percent of the ginger, 90 percent of the poppyseed, 90 percent 
of the tea and 99 percent of the cowhides from Calcutta to Britain, but only 40 percent of the jute 
cuttings, and one third of the rice (Fletcher 1958, p. 561). 
 A series of innovations in subsequent decades helped make steamships more efficient: the 
screw propeller, the compound engine, steel hulls, bigger size and shorter turn-around time in 
port. Another important development was the opening of the Suez Canal on November 17, 1869. 
Far Eastern trade was still dominated by sail: in the absence of sufficient coaling stations around 
the coast, the trip around Africa by steamer required carrying too much coal.  The compound 
engine reduced fuel requirements, and the Suez Canal made it possible to pick up coal at 
Gibraltar, Malta and Port Said, in addition to halving the distance from London to Bombay. Not 
only did the Suez Canal make it possible for steamships to compete on Asian routes, but it was of 
no use to sailing ships, who would have to be towed for the roughly one-hundred mile journey. 
Before 1869, steam tonnage had never exceeded sail tonnage in British shipyards; in 1870, steam 
tonnage was over twice as great as sail, and sail tonnage only exceeded steam in two years after 
that date (Fletcher 1958). 
 The other major 19th century development in transportation was, of course, the railroad. 
The Liverpool-Manchester line opened in 1830; early Continental emulators included Belgium, 
France and Germany. The growth in railway mileage during the late 19th century was 
phenomenal, particularly in the United States, where trains would play a major role in creating a 
truly national market. Indeed, transport costs between the American Midwest and East Coast fell 
even more dramatically than trans-Atlantic transport costs during the late 19th century. Drawing 
on American sources, the British Board of Trade published in 1903 an annual series of transport 
costs for the wheat trade between Chicago, New York and Liverpool. It cost 6 shillings and 11 
pence to ship a quarter of wheat by lake and rail from Chicago to New York in 1868. The cost 
using rail alone was 10s/2d. The cost of shipping a quarter of wheat from New York to Liverpool 
                                                          
10 This section draws heavily on O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, Chapter 3). 
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by steamer was 4s/7½d.11 In 1902, these costs had fallen to 1s/11d, 2s/11d and 11½d respectively. 
The percentage decline in trans-Atlantic costs may have been greater, but in absolute terms it was 
the technical improvements on American railways that did most of the work in reducing price 
gaps between producer and consumer.12 In any case, regional price convergence within the United 
States was dramatic. The wheat price spread between New York City and Iowa fell from 69 to 19 
percent from 1870 to 1910, and from 52 to 10 percent between New York City and Wisconsin 
(Williamson 1974, p. 259).  
 The railroad had similar effects elsewhere. Jacob Metzer (1974) provided the evidence 
for Russia, where railway construction took off after the mid-1860s. He finds a clear decline in St 
Petersburg-Odessa price gaps for wheat and rye, starting in the 1870s; bilateral grain price 
differentials declined for a wider sample of nine markets between 1893 and 1913. Corresponding 
to this price convergence was a growing regional dispersion of wheat and rye production, as 
regions specialized according to their comparative advantage. John Hurd (1975) has documented 
the predictable consequences of the railroad for Indian food grain prices, as internal transport 
costs were reduced by about 80 percent.  The coefficient of variation of wheat and rice prices 
across districts fell from over 40 percent in 1870 to well below 20 percent in the decade before 
World War I; moreover, the coefficient of variation was consistently higher among India’s 
districts without railways than among districts with railways. 
 What was the impact of these transport innovations on the cost of moving goods between 
countries? Knick Harley’s (1988) index of British ocean freight rates remains relatively constant 
between 1740 and 1840, before dropping by about 70% between 1840 and 1910. The North 
(1958) freight rate index among American export routes dropped by more than 41 percent in real 
terms between 1870 and 1910. These two indices imply a decline in Atlantic economy transport 
costs of about 1.5 percent per annum, or a total of 45 percentage points up to 1913. The transport 
revolution was not limited to the Atlantic economy: Harlaftis and Kardasis (2000) have shown 
that the declines in freight rates between 1870 and 1914 were just as dramatic on routes involving 
Black Sea and Egyptian ports as on those involving Atlantic ports. Meanwhile, the tramp charter 
rate for shipping rice from Rangoon to Europe, for example, fell from 73.8 to 18.1 percent of the 
Rangoon price between 1882 and 1914;13 the freight rate on coal (relative to its export price) 
between Nagasaki and Shanghai fell by 76 percent between 1880 and 1910; and total factor 
                                                          
11These figures imply that transport costs from Chicago to Liverpool were about 19 percent of the New 
York wheat price in 1868.  
12Harley’s (1980) data tell a similar story. 
13 The Asian material that follows in this section and section 6.4 draws on Williamson (1999, 2000). 
 
17
productivity on Japan's tramp freighter routes serving Asia advanced at 2.5 percent per annum in 
the thirty years between 1879 and 1909 (Yasuba 1978, Tables 1 and 5). 
 
5. 2. 19th century trade policy: 2 steps forward, 1 step back 14 
 Paul Bairoch (1989, p. 7) has described European trade policy after Waterloo as ‘an 
ocean of protectionism surrounding a few liberal islands.’ Gradually, however, the demand for 
trade liberalization in Britain grew, partly under the influence of economists like David Ricardo, 
partly as a result of the growing power of urban interests, symbolized by the Reform Act of 1832. 
The pro-globalization movement applied to both commodity and factor markets. Skilled workers 
were allowed to emigrate in 1825, an option which had not been available to them since 1719. A 
new Corn Law Act in 1828 abandoned import prohibitions for grains, replacing them with a 
sliding scale tariff which varied inversely with the domestic price of grain. Various tariffs were 
reduced again in 1833. Robert Peel allowed the export of machinery in 1842 (banned since 1774), 
abolished the export tax on wool, and reduced protection on grains and other goods still further. 
Tariffs were again reduced in 1845. Britain finally made the decisive move towards free trade by 
repealing the Corn Laws in 1846. 
 The British example was followed by the rest of Europe, but much more slowly: 
...before 1860 only a few small Continental countries, representing only 4% of 
Europe’s population, had adopted a truly liberal trade policy. These were the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal and Switzerland, to which we may add Sweden 
and Belgium (but only from 1856-7 onwards), and even these maintained some 
degree of protection.  (Bairoch 1993, p. 22) 
 
 The Cobden Chevalier treaty between France and the United Kingdom was not signed 
until 23 January 1860, but, though delayed, the signature heralded a decisive shift towards 
European free trade.  The treaty abolished all French import prohibitions, replacing them with ad 
valorem duties not to exceed 30 percent. Britain reduced wine tariffs by more than 80 percent, 
admitted many French products duty free, and abolished the export duty on coal. Most 
importantly, perhaps, the treaty's use of the most-favored-nation (MFN) clause established the 
principle of non-discrimination as a cornerstone of European commercial practice. The clause 
stipulated that each country would automatically extend to the other any trade concessions 
granted to third parties. MFN clauses were inserted into the many bilateral trade treaties that 
followed in the ensuing years, ensuring that bilateral concessions were generalized to all. France 
and Belgium signed a treaty in 1861; a Franco-Prussian treaty was signed in 1862; Italy entered 
                                                          
14 This section draws heavily on O’Rourke and Williamson (1999, Chapters 3, 6), who in turn draw heavily 
on Bairoch (1989), the standard reference on European trade policy in this period. 
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the ‘network of Cobden-Chevalier treaties’ in 1863 (Bairoch 1989, p. 40); Switzerland in 1864; 
Sweden, Norway, Spain, the Netherlands and the Hanseatic towns in 1865; and Austria in 1866. 
By 1877, less than two decades after the Cobden Chevalier treaty and three decades after British 
Repeal, Germany ‘had virtually become a free trade country’ (Bairoch 1989, p. 41). Average 
duties on manufactured products had declined to 9-12 percent on the European Continent, a far 
cry from the 50 percent British tariffs, and ‘numerous’ prohibitions elsewhere, of the immediate 
post-Waterloo era (Bairoch 1989, Table 3, p. 6; Table 5, p. 42). 
 Until the 1870s, therefore, European trade policy trends were reinforcing the impact of 
the transport cost declines outlined earlier. Things would soon change, however. The turning 
point came in the late 1870s and 1880s, when the impact of cheap New World and Russian grain 
began to make itself felt in European markets: for example, real British land rents fell by over 50 
percent between 1870 and 1913. Almost all of this British decline can be attributed to 
international commodity market integration (O’Rourke and Williamson 1994); more generally, 
by the late 19th century international trade was having a profound impact on income distribution, 
lowering the incomes of landowners relative to those of workers throughout Europe (Lindert and 
Williamson 2001). Wherever landed interests were powerful enough, the legislative reaction was 
predictable. The German turning point came in 1879, when Bismarck protected both agriculture 
and industry. While the specific tariffs started low, they were raised in 1885, and again in 1887, 
reaching the equivalent of about 33 percent ad valorem on wheat and 47 percent on rye. In 
France, tariffs were raised in the 1880s, but the protectionist breakthrough is commonly taken to 
be 1892 when the Méline tariff was adopted; by 1894, the duty on wheat was equivalent to an ad 
valorem rate of 32 percent. In Sweden, agricultural protection was reimposed in 1888, and 
industrial protection was increased in 1892. Italy had been a free trader in the wake of 
Unification, but shortly thereafter it introduced moderate tariffs in 1878, followed by rather more 
severe tariffs in 1887. 
 There was thus a common pattern across western Europe of liberalization followed by a 
reversion to protection, prompted by the distributional effects of the grain invasion. There were 
exceptions: for example, liberalization was both shorter and less dramatic in Iberia. Other small 
countries were more liberal in the wake of the grain invasion; for example, Denmark adhered to 
agricultural free trade throughout, switching from being a net grain exporter to a net grain 
importer (feed for its booming animal husbandry).15 The Netherlands followed a similar path, 
maintaining free trade throughout the period. Dutch farmers also adopted improved techniques, 
and developed a strong export trade in animal products, fruit and vegetables (Tracy 1989, p. 23). 
                                                          
15It did however impose tariffs on various manufactured goods: manufactured textiles faced duties of 
between 20 and 25 percent (Bairoch 1989, p. 81). 
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Both Belgium and Switzerland maintained free, or nearly free grain imports, although they did 
impose some duties on animal products, as well as moderate duties on manufactured goods. Most 
importantly, the United Kingdom also maintained free trade, despite some domestic dissension. 
 In summary, there was a major retreat from open trade policies in Europe towards the end 
of the nineteenth century, triggered largely by pressure from landowners. Transport cost declines 
led to distributional changes, which in turn prompted an attempt by the losers to insulate 
themselves from the international economy. Moreover, it turns out that countries such as 
Denmark which retained agricultural free trade were less vulnerable to the agricultural output and 
land price reductions which globalization implied (O’Rourke 1997). Elsewhere, it seems that 
globalization undermined itself. 
 New World landowners benefitted from free trade, of course, but this does not mean that 
New World trade policy was any more liberal. In the United States, those infant industries 
mentioned earlier which sprang up during the French Wars had formed the basis for a long-
standing Northern pro-tariff lobby: Northern victory in the Civil War had predictable 
consequences for subsequent tariff policy.  Tariffs were raised during the war for revenue 
purposes, but Republican domination of Congress would ensure that they remained exceptionally 
high for a very long time thereafter. 
 Canada also protected manufacturing, especially after 1878 when the Conservatives were 
elected on a protectionist platform. In Australia, the Victoria tariff bill of 1865 allowed for 
maximum ad valorem tariffs of 10 percent, but by 1893, after a succession of tariff increases, the 
maximum rates stood at 45 percent (Siriwardana 1991, p. 47). The first federal tariff of 1902 
represented a compromise between protectionist Victoria and the other more liberal colonies, but 
protection was greatly strengthened in 1906 and 1908 (Bairoch 1989, pp. 146-7) and it proved to 
be remarkably enduring. 
 While the third quarter of the 19th century saw an easing of protection in Latin America, 
tariffs rose again in the final quarter. Argentina increased tariffs from the 1870s onwards (Bairoch 
1989, pp. 150-1). By 1913, average tariffs were almost 35 percent in Uruguay, almost 40 percent 
in Brazil, and over 45 percent in Venezuela (Bulmer-Thomas 1994, p. 142). It appears that the 
highest tariff barriers were in the New World, not Europe. The tariffs were directed towards 
manufactures and they served to favor scarce urban labor and capital while penalizing abundant 
land. 
 Late 19th century trade policy thus offset the impact of transport cost declines in both 
Europe and the New World. The opposite was the case in Asia, where Japan switched from 
virtual autarky to free trade in 1858.  Other Asian nations – China, Siam, Korea, India and 
Indonesia – also followed this liberal path, most forced to do so by colonial dominance or 
gunboat diplomacy. This shift had largely taken place from the 1860s; from then on, commodity 
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price convergence was driven entirely by sharply declining transport costs in Asia without much 
change in tariffs one way or the other. 
 
5.3. 19th century commodity market integration 
 What impact did these technological and political developments have on international 
commodity markets? As we have seen, world trade grew at a little over 1% per annum between 
1500 and 1800, but it has grown at around 3.5% per annum since 1820, with the 19th and 20th 
century growth rates being roughly equal (Maddison 1995). Indeed, the 19th century growth rate 
was more impressive than the 20th, in the sense that world GDP growth was twice as high since 
1913 as it was between 1820 and 1913: the implication is that trade ratios (e.g. the ratio of 
mechandise exports to GDP) grew more rapidly during the 19th century than they did during the 
20th. Table 3 documents the eight-fold increase in this ratio worldwide between 1820 and 1913, 
when merchandise exports accounted for almost 8% of world GDP, and more than 16% of 
western European GDP.  
 The 19th century marks a dramatic break with the past insofar as intercontinental 
commodity market integration is concerned, since as we have seen there was little or no 
intercontinental price convergence prior to 1800. By contrast, Figure 2 indicated that there was 
substantial Dutch-Asian price convergence during the 19th century, while late 19th century price 
convergence more generally has been extensively documented. For example, Liverpool wheat 
prices exceeded Chicago prices by 57.6 percent in 1870, by 17.8 percent in 1895, and by only 
15.6 percent in 1913 (O’Rourke and Williamson 1994, based on Harley 1980). London-
Cincinnati price differentials for bacon were 92.5 percent in 1870, over 100 in 1880, 92.3 in 
1895, and 17.9 in 1913. The Boston-Manchester cotton textile price gap fell from 13.7 percent in 
1870 to -3.6 percent in 1913; the Philadelphia-London iron bar price gap fell from 75 to 20.6 
percent, while the pig iron price gap fell from 85.2 to 19.3 percent, and the copper price gap fell 
from 32.7 to almost zero; the Boston-London hides price gap fell from 27.7 to 8.7 percent, while 
the wool price gap fell from 59.1 to 27.9 percent. Commodity price convergence can also be 
documented for coal, tin and coffee (ibid). 
 Continental European grain tariffs did succeed in impeding international price 
convergence (O’Rourke 1997), but O’Rourke and Williamson (1995) document significant price 
convergence in the British-Swedish case. Meanwhile, in Asia trade policy strengthened the 
impact of technological developments.16 The cotton price spread between Liverpool and Bombay 
fell from 57 percent in 1873 to 20 percent in 1913, and the jute price spread between London and 
Calcutta fell from 35 to 4 percent (Collins 1996, Table 4). The same events were taking place 
                                                          
16 The remainder of this paragraph draws on O’Rourke and Williamson (2000). 
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even farther east, involving Burma and the rest of Southeast Asia: the rice price spread between 
London and Rangoon fell from 93 to 26 percent in the four decades prior to 1913 (Collins 1996, 
Table 4). Finally, the impact of transport revolutions on commodity price convergence involving 
the eastern Mediterranean was just as powerful. The average percentage by which Liverpool 
cotton prices exceeded Alexandria price quotes was: 1824-1832 42.1; 1837-1846 63.2; 1863-
1867 40.8; 1882-1889 14.7 and 1890-1899 5.3 (Issawi 1966, pp. 447-8). Commodity market 
integration in the late 19th century was both impressive in scale, and global in scope: indeed, 
Third World economies were becoming more rapidly integrated with the rest of the world than 
their Atlantic economy counterparts during this period (Williamson 2000). 
 
5.4. Trade in the late 19th century: conclusion 
 By 1913, international commodity markets were vastly more integrated than they had 
been in 1750, world trade accounted for a far higher share of world output, and a far broader 
range of goods, including commodities with a high bulk to value ratio, were being transported 
between continents. These trends, in combination with rapid industrialization in northwest Europe 
and its overseas offshoots, had a dramatic impact on the worldwide division of labor. By the late 
19th century there was a stark distinction between industrial and primary producing economies. 
According to the available figures (given in Table 4), primary products accounted for between 62 
and 64 percent of total world exports in the late 19th century: in 1913, food accounted for 27 
percent of world exports, agricultural raw materials for 22.7 percent and minerals for 14 percent. 
The UK and northwest Europe were net importers of primary products, and net exporters of 
manufactured goods. North America still exported primary products, but rapid industrialization 
there was leading to a more balanced trade in manufactures over time. Meanwhile, Oceania, Latin 
America and Africa exported virtually no manufactured goods, and Asian exports were 
overwhelmingly composed of primary products; for example, according to Lamartine Yates 
(1959, p.250) primary products accounted for more than three quarters of India’s exports in 1913. 
By contrast, textiles had still accounted for more than half of the English East India Company’s 
exports to Europe in the late 1750s (Table 1, Panel C).  By 1811-12 the share of piecegoods in 
India’s exports had declined to 33%; the figure was 14.3% just three years later, and only 3.7% in 
1850-51. By 1910-11 the share of cotton goods in exports had increased to 6%, but this was 
dwarfed by the share of raw cotton in exports (17.2%).17 The contrast with the situation 150 years 
previously was striking; the impact of this changing division of labor on growth in both the core 
and periphery would become a major subject of economic debate in the 20th century, particularly 
in the periphery. In turn, this would eventually have significant effects on policy in the 
                                                          





Section 6. World trade 1914-2000 
6.1. The First World War and its aftermath  
 World War I brought the liberal economic order of the late 19th century to an abrupt end: 
while there were signs of a globalization backlash from the 1870s onwards, 1914 clearly marked 
a dramatic and discontinuous break with the past. Both sides attempted to disrupt the others’ 
trade, through blockades or U-boat campaigns; even more serious was the centralized control 
which even traditionally liberal governments, such as the British, imposed on trade and shipping, 
with scarce cargo space necessitating that government dictate both the composition of imports 
through a system of quotas, and the allocation of shipping capacity. This was of course part of a 
more general shift towards massive and unprecedented government intervention in the economy, 
with military expenditure absorbing 38% of UK national output during 1916-17, and 53% of 
German national output during 1917. In Britain, the McKenna tariff of 1915, designed to save on 
scarce shipping space, was explicitly protectionist. Moreover, this shift was not reversed after the 
war: the Key Industries Act of 1919 and the Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921 introduced 
additional protection (Kindleberger 1989). These acts did not represent widespread and severe 
protection– at the beginning of the 1930s, only £13 m. worth of imports were subject to these 
tariffs, compared with the £138 m. subject to traditional revenue duties, and a total import bill of 
£1030 m. (Kenwood and Lougheed 1983, p. 216). Nonetheless, they represented a break with 
Britain’s free-trade past. 
 Surprisingly, import shares fell only marginally in Britain during the war; it was exports 
that collapsed (from 20 to 13% of GDP), as resources were diverted to the war effort and raw 
materials for export industries were rationed. In France, the import share rose from 20% before 
the war to 36.7% during it; again, exports fell sharply.18 Correspondingly, export ratios rose in 
neutral economies such as Sweden; in Japan; and in North America, where grain production 
expanded sharply during the war years to meet Allied demand. It was this reorientation of trade, 
and the consequent supply responses, which led to some of the most destructive long term 
economic consequences of the war: agricultural over-supply would be a chronic problem 
contributing to trade tensions after the war. In addition, the absence of European manufactured 
exports on world markets stimulated the expansion of industrial capacity, above all in the United 
States and Japan, but also in countries such as India, Australia, and Latin America. Just as excess 
food supplies would lead to pressures for agricultural protection, so the hothouse stimulation of 
industrial ‘war babies’ would lead to post-war demands for industrial protection in India, 
                                                          
18 Based on Jones and Obstfeld (1997) and Mitchell (1992). 
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Australia and Argentina (Kenwood and Lougheed 1983, pp. 185-6; Eichengreen 1994, pp.88-89). 
Once again, wartime shocks would have a long run impact on trade flows and resource allocation, 
in part because of their impact on policy. To this by now traditional mechanism was added the 
impact of the emergence of new nation states in Europe (Feinstein et al. 1997, pp. 28-32); while 
nationalist leaders in today’s aspiring nation states, such as Scotland and Quebec, speak of a free-
trading future (Alesina and Spolaore 1997), in the early 20th century independence was typically 
costly from an economic standpoint, involving the adoption of protectionist policies (Johnson 
1965). 
 The end of war did not imply an end to protection. Subsequent British tariff acts have 
already been mentioned; quantitative restrictions on trade remained prevalent, particularly in 
Central and South Eastern Europe, due largely to shortages of food, raw materials, and currency 
problems; meanwhile, anti-dumping legislation was introduced in Japan in 1920, and in Australia, 
New Zealand, the UK and the US in 1921. In 1922 the United States, whose government was 
once again in Republican hands, passed the Fordney-McCumber tariff act, which substantially 
raised tariffs (Kindleberger 1989, pp. 162-3; League of Nations 1942, p. 18; Irwin 1998a, p.328). 
While quantitative restrictions were eventually abolished, these were replaced with high tariffs; 
for example, average tariffs on industrial products were 28% in Yugoslavia, compared with a pre-
war figure of 18%. The corresponding figures for France were 25.8%, as compared with 16.3%; 
and for Germany they were 19%, as compared with 10% (Liepmann (1938), cited in Irwin 1993, 
p. 105).  
 The international community was active in calling for liberalization, but ultimately 
ineffectual. Appeals for the resumption of free trade were made by the Supreme Economic 
Council in 1920, by the Genoa Conference in 1922, and by the World Economic Conference in 
1927, among others.  In its retrospective on the interwar period, the League of Nations itself 
(ibid., p. 42) ruefully acknowledged the paradox that “the international conferences unanimously 
recommended, and the great majority of Governments repeatedly proclaimed their intention to 
pursue, policies designed to bring about conditions of “freer and more equal trade”; yet never 
before in history were trade barriers raised so rapidly or discrimination so widely practised” 
(ibid., p. 101). Few if any commentators have dissented from this negative assessment. 
 The symbol of interwar protection remains the American Smoot-Hawley tariff, whose 
roots lay in the wartime extension of non-European agricultural supplies mentioned earlier. With 
the resumption of European supplies, overproduction began to be a chronic problem, and 
agricultural prices fell– wheat prices, for example, fell sharply from 1925. Continental European 
protection made the situation of New World suppliers worse; while some exporting governments 
(the Canadians and Americans) attempted to keep domestic prices high, the Soviet Union’s aim 
of earning sufficient revenues to pay for capital equipment imports led it to export more as prices 
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fell, thus exacerbating the problem (Kindleberger 1973, Ch. 4). The fact that Russian peasants’ 
supply curves were upward-sloping, unlike that of their government, inevitably led to conflict, 
and widespread suffering (Kindleberger 1989, p. 184). 
 Herbert Hoover thus promised US farmers tariff protection, and called a special session 
of Congress in early 1929 to deliver on his pledge. The Smoot-Hawley tariff which emerged in 
mid-1930 protected industry as well as agriculture, and represented a substantial increase in 
overall protection.19 Deflation over the course of the next two years would increase average tariffs 
by an even greater extent (Crucini 1994; Irwin 1998b). In contrast to the 19th century experience, 
the United States was now sufficiently important that the tariff triggered a wave of tariff increases 
in countries such as Canada, France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland (Kindleberger 1989, Jones 
1934), although the extent to which the more general rise in tariffs which followed was due to 
retaliation, as opposed to various domestic causes, remains subject to dispute (Eichengreen 1989, 
Irwin 1998a). At a minimum, the tariff sent the signal that the United States was not willing to be 
the unilateral guarantor of open markets that the United Kingdom had been before the war. In any 
event, the increases were severe: by 1931, average tariffs on foodstuffs had risen to 82.5% in 
Germany, 53% in France, 66% in Italy, 59.5% in Austria, and 75% in Yugoslavia (Liepmann 
1938, cited in Irwin 1993, p. 105). Even the traditionally free-trading Netherlands abandoned a 
three-centuries long tradition of open markets when it intervened to prop up agricultural prices in 
1931 (Kindleberger 1989, pp. 178-9).  
 In 1932 Britain took a decisive move towards protection, establishing 10% tariffs on a 
wide variety of imports; for a few months, little Ireland was one of the only free-trade holdouts in 
Europe, but later that year she succumbed as Éamon de Valera was elected, and embarked on a 
wholesale trade war with the United Kingdom. In opting for a policy of import substitution, 
Ireland was typical of primary producers around the periphery, most notably in Latin America, 
and as in Latin America the policy seemed initially to be successful in insulating the economy 
from the worst effects of the Great Depression (Diaz Alejandro 1984; O’Rourke 1991). Certainly, 
the traditional export-oriented policy seemed no longer to be working: between 1928/9 and 
1932/3, the value of exports fell by over 80% in Chile; by 75-80% in China; by 70-75% in 
Bolivia, Cuba, Malaya, Peru and Salvador; by 65-70% in a further 13 primary-exporters, and by 
over 50% in a further 22 (Kindleberger 1973, p. 191). 
                                                          
19 How substantial depends on how the average tariff is measured: as a share of total imports, tariff 
revenues in 1931 were around 18%, which as De Long (1998) points out would have been a low tariff by 
19th century standards, and was less than the level attained at the start of the century (De Long 1998, p.358; 
Eichengreen 1989, p.16). As a share of dutiable imports, however, tariff revenues were higher in 1931 and 
1932 than they had been in 1900, and, Irwin claims, the Smoot-Hawley tariffs were “arguably the highest 
since the Civil War” (Irwin 1998a, p.327). 
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 The Great Depression was of course a major further reason for the adoption of severe 
protection, and not just in the periphery. In France, quotas became widespread during the 1930s, 
while in Germany the Nazi regime instituted ‘totalitarian’ quantitative controls on foreign trade 
reminiscent of a war economy. By 1937, 58% of French imports were covered by some sort of 
quantitative restriction, with the corresponding figures for Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
Belgium being 52%, 26% and 24% respectively (Haberler 1943, cited in Irwin 1993, p. 108). 
Irwin (1993) makes the point that there was a trade-off between countries’ adherence to monetary 
orthodoxy and their adherence to free trade orthodoxy: the four countries just mentioned stuck 
rigidly to the Gold Standard for much of the 1930s, leading to deflation, overvaluation, and 
balance of payments difficulties. Quantitative restrictions were in large measure a response to 
these difficulties. In central and Eastern Europe, countries responded to similar problems by 
following Germany’s lead and introducing widespread exchange controls: this “pernicious 
bilateralism”, as Irwin (1993) calls it, combined with the imperial preferences of Britain 
(established in Ottowa in 1932) and other colonial powers, led to the complete breakdown of the 
MFN principle of non-discrimination. 
 Beginning in 1932, there were several signs that at least some countries were trying to 
moderate, if not reverse, the increases in protectionism of the previous year or two, although the 
World Economic Conference of 1933 proved a failure. In 1932 what we now know as the three 
Benelux countries agreed at Ouchy to start cutting tariffs on each others’ exports; this agreement 
came to nothing as it required other countries, with whom the Ouchy group had MFN relations, to 
waive their MFN rights, which the UK refused to do. The Oslo group, comprising the Ouchy 
three, plus Denmark, Norway, Sweden and (eventually) Finland, had met in 1930 for discussions 
on tariff reform, and agreed in the Hague in 1937 to a program of eliminating quotas between 
member states– on the basis that this would not violate others’ MFN rights, which only applied to 
tariffs. Most importantly, perhaps, the 1932 US Presidential election led to the appointment of the 
strongly pro-free trade Cordell Hull as Secretary of State. In 1934, the US Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act delegated authority to the Executive to conclude trade agreements, which Hull 
proceeded to do. By 1939, the US had signed 20 treaties with countries accounting for 60% of its 
trade, the most important of which was with the UK– although this last treaty only came into 
effect in 1939, and was soon overtaken by events. 
 One interesting theme which emerges from the literature on interwar trade policy 
concerns the role of the MFN principle during the period. As mentioned previously, the common 
perception is that the MFN clause played a crucial role in the years after 1860 in speeding up 
Europe’s shift to free trade, by generalizing concessions that were being made anyway. By 
contrast, the literature has not been so kind regarding the impact of the clause during the 1920s 
and 1930s. We have already mentioned the chilling effect which the MFN principle had on the 
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Ouchy group’s attempts to promote more rapid regional trade liberalization; more generally, it 
has long been recognized that once countries are bound together in a web of MFN treaty 
obligations, and attempt to advance tariff reductions through bilateral deals, a free-rider problem 
may arise, with all parties waiting to reap the benefits of other parties’ agreements. The League of 
Nations had been a persistent advocate of the principle of non-discrimination, but was forced to 
admit in 1942, in its review of trade policy in the 1920s, that “instead of facilitating, the clause 
tended to obstruct the reduction of tariffs by means of bilateral or multilateral agreements, owing 
to the reluctance of governments to make concessions which would be generalized by it. This was 
the result, mainly, of two causes: first, the refusal of the United States to reduce its own very high 
tariff by negotiation while claiming to benefit from any tariff reduction negotiated between 
European countries; secondly, the opposition of certain countries-- notably the United Kingdom, 
the United States and the British Dominions-- to derogations from strict MFN practice permitting 
the conclusion of regional or similar agreements for tariff reduction, the benefits of which would 
be limited to the participants” (League of Nations 1942, p. 119). 
 How to explain this distinction between the experiences of the 1860s and 1870s, and the 
interwar period? One approach would be to speculate that, in a multi-country situation in which 
bilateral tariff bargaining might produce multiple equilibria, the introduction of the MFN clause 
might serve to produce more extreme equilibria, both good and bad. An alternative interpretation 
of the data is that the 1860s wave of tariff-cutting succeeded because the bilateral MFN treaties 
were, initially, discriminatory: once Britain and France had granted each other concessions, the 
Belgians found themselves at a disadvantage in these markets, and had an incentive to conclude a 
treaty, and so on. Thus, the MFN treaties of the 1860s in fact constituted an example of what 
Irwin (1993, p. 112) calls ‘progressive’ bilateralism, of the sort that Cordell Hull was advocating 
in the 1930s: in his submission to the 1933 London conference, he proposed that the MFN 
principle not be invoked to prevent agreements among groups of countries, but suggested that a 
number of conditions be attached, one of which was that such agreements be “open to the 
accession of all countries” (Viner 1950, p. 35).20 
 MFN was of course a cornerstone of the post-war GATT, which has seen a dramatic 
                                                          
20 The latter interpretation would lead to a sanguine view of regional trade agreements; on the other hand, 
some of the costs of discrimination identified by recent authors have their echoes in the historical record 
too. For example, the argument that in the absence of the MFN principle, countries may be reluctant to 
reach bilateral agreements on the grounds that their partners may reach subsequent agreements which “by 
granting to third countries concessions still greater than those given to themselves, and to which they would 
have no claim, would render nugatory the concessions which they received” (Viner 1951, p. 107; Bagwell 
and Staiger 1999), finds support in the failure of the United States (and Sardinia) to negotiate satisfactory 
trade agreements while pursuing a conditional MFN policy in the 19th century. It was largely as a result of 
this experience that the US adopted the unconditional form of the MFN in 1923. 
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decline in tariff barriers (see below). The initial rounds continued to cut tariffs on the basis of 
bilateral agreements that were then multilateralized through the MFN principle to all GATT 
members. (However, initially it was only the richer countries which were involved: less 
developed countries only joined in from the mid-1960s onwards.) While the initial Geneva round 
was a success, other rounds, such as Torquay, were less so, and eventually the GATT shifted to 
multilateral deal-making, which was to prove such a success in the 1960s (Irwin 1995).  
 
6.2. Twentieth century transport costs 
 Transport costs continued to fall during the 20th century, but at a slower rate than 
previously. Isserlis (1938) provides an index of British tramp freight rates from 1869 to 1936. As 
Figure 4 shows, between 1869/71 and 1911/13, these freight rates (deflated by the Statist 
wholesale price index) fell by 22 percentage points, a figure which is reduced by the fact that 
rates increased sharply in 1911 and 1912; fitted values based on a regression of these deflated 
rates on time and time-squared show a drop of 34 percent. As expected the rates increased sharply 
during the war, remaining abnormally high until 1920. While they continued to fall until 1925, 
they never attained their prewar levels, and rose thereafter, with the overall trend between 1921 
and 1936 being broadly flat (at a level roughly equal to the 1869 level). 
 In the most careful study of post-1945 trends to date, David Hummels (1999) concludes 
that ocean freight rates have actually increased over much of the period. An index of liner 
shipping prices, calculated by the German Ministry of Transport, rises from 1954 to 1958, is 
fairly flat until 1970 (despite the introduction of containers in the 1960s), rises through the 1970s, 
peaks in 1985, and falls sharply thereafter. Deflated by the German GDP deflator, it never attains 
its 1960s levels, even as late as 1997; deflated by the US GDP deflator, it only recovers to its 
1954 position by 1993. A less representative tramp shipping index, constructed by the Norwegian 
Shipping News, shows that tramp freight rates were constant or increased between 1952 and 
1997, when deflated by a commodity price deflator; when deflated by a US GDP deflator they 
declined over the period as a whole, but were flat or increased over long subperiods. Moreover, 
the tramp rates, unlike the liner rates, exclude port costs which were sharply rising during the 
period. 
 On the other hand, it is important to stress that air freight rates have declined dramatically 
in the 1950s, 1960s and 1980s, while declining more slowly in the 1990s, and rising in the 1970s. 
These declines were greatest on North American routes. The result, predictably enough, has been 
a more than ten-fold increase in the ratio of air to ocean shipments in the years since 1962 
(Hummels 1999). 
6.3. Late twentieth century trade policies 
 If transport cost declines were much less impressive during the late 20th century than they 
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were in the late 19th, then it follows that trade liberalization probably played a much greater role 
in commodity market integration in the later period than it did during the former. Table 5 gives 
average tariffs on manufactured products in a number of countries for which data are available 
back to 1913. It shows clearly the rise in protection during the interwar period, and the decline in 
tariff barriers since 1950. It also shows that for most of these countries, tariffs are much lower 
today than in 1913. There are exceptions, of course, notably Britain, as well as certain Asian 
countries which had a low tariff regime forced upon them by European powers or the United 
States. Both China and India, for example, have substantially higher tariffs now than in 1913: an 
extremely important caveat given these countries’ populations. As Table 5 suggests, tariffs are 
much higher now in developing countries than in rich countries, while the opposite was more true 
of the late 19th century. Table 6 gives average tariffs on manufactured goods in Latin America, 
East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s and early 1990s: it shows a substantial 
decline in Latin America, and smaller declines in the other 2 regions. By the early 1990s, these 
average tariffs stood at 12.5% in Latin America, 17.1% in East Asia, and 22.5% in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as compared with figures of 4 or 5% for the United States, the EU, and Japan. 
 It is important to remember, of course, that emphasizing industrial tariffs overstates the 
extent to which industrial countries today have moved towards free trade, since agricultural 
protection (which triggered the move back towards protection in late 19th century Europe, as well 
as the protection of the late 1920s) remains extremely high in many wealthy countries, higher 
certainly than in many countries in 1913. Coppel and Durand (1999) report that protection raises 
the prices received by farmers by about 60% in Japan, 40% in the European Union, 15% in 
Canada, and 20% in the United States. Moreover, non-tariff barriers (such as countervailing and 
anti-dumping duties, quotas, VERs, production subsidies, and technical barriers to trade) are 
much more important today than they were in 1913. According to Coppel and Durand (1999, 
Table 2), NTBs became less pervasive in all the major industrial economies between 1988 and 
1996, although the use of anti-dumping measures has become more common, and has been on the 
increase in the EU and outside the OECD. Meanwhile, the average incidence of NTBs on 
manufactured imports fell in Latin America from 28.4% in the mid-1980s to 1.8% in the early 
1990s; it fell from 23.1% to 5.5% in East Asia; and it increased from 42.7% to 45.4% in Sub-
Saharan Africa between 1984-7 and 1988-90 (Rodrik 1999, Table 1.3). For all these reasons one 
cannot automatically assume that average world-wide protection is less severe today than it was 
in 1913. 
 Given the increased importance of NTBs, it is difficult to measure long run trends in the 
overall stance of trade policy, although in principle measures such as the trade restrictiveness 
index (Anderson and Neary 1994) could do precisely this. Nonetheless, the consensus is that the 
world is becoming more open; for example, according to Sachs and Warner (1995) all regions 
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have become more open in recent decades. However, Africa still lags well behind the rest of the 
world: as late as 1992, only 30% of African countries were judged open by Sachs and Warner, as 
compared with 86% of countries in the Latin American and Carribean region, and 67% of Asian 
countries (Figure 5). 
 The reasons for the descent of the interwar economy into protectionism are well 
understood, and have been touched on above. But what were the fundamentals driving postwar 
liberalization, and even more importantly, what can explain the differential timing of 
liberalization across regions? The US liberalized almost immediately; as Figure 5, based on Sachs 
and Warner, suggests, Western Europe waited about 15 years to liberalize, and when it did, it did 
so in a rush, at the end of the 1950s (although the EPU, ECSC and OEEC had been promoting 
intra-European trade since the beginning of the decade). By contrast, Latin America became 
progressively more closed from the 1950s onwards, only opening in the 1980s (along with New 
Zealand), a quarter century after the Europeans: yet another powerful example of path 
dependence arising from an exogenous shock (in this case, world depression rather than war), and 
operating through the political process. The former Communist economies only opened during 
the 1990s; much of Africa still remains closed. 
 Were ideas or interests responsible for these differences between regions? On the one 
hand, when countries in Latin America or elsewhere turned to import substitution during the 
1930s and 1940s, this created constituencies which now depended on protection, and lobbied for 
its maintenance; an interest-based explanation would require arguing that for some reason, the 
protectionist coalitions of capital and labor which characterized Latin America or Australasia 
were more powerful than similar coalitions which emerged in peripheral European economies, for 
example. Alternatively, disillusion with the market as a result of the interwar experience led many 
intellectuals and policy makers to advocate socialism or state-led industrialization which was 
inimical to open markets. Bodies such as the UN Economic Commission for Latin America were 
influential in advocating import substitution, and their hostility to free trade was shared by many 
development economists (Corbo 1992, Krueger 1997). Were these ideas more appealing to 
developing country elites, and if so why? If ideas explain postwar protection, then disillusion with 
those ideas must explain eventual liberalization; and indeed, in countries such as Ireland there 
was deep disillusion with import substitution by the late 1950s. Why did it take longer for the 
failures of that policy to become apparent elsewhere? And what were the roles of the Cold War in 
explaining OECD liberalization, or of decolonization in explaining sub-Saharan or Indian 
protection? Although much work has been done on individual countries and regions, we have not 
yet seen a comprehensive and comparative account which can explain the diversity of the post-




6.4. Commodity market integration in the 20th century 
 What have been the combined impact of the transport cost and trade policy developments 
documented above? Turning to the volume of trade first, Table 3 shows that merchandise exports 
accounted for a smaller share of world GDP in 1950 than they had done in 1913; and that the 
1913 levels of openness (on this measure) had not been recouped as late as 1973 in the UK, 
Spain, Australia, Latin America, China, India and Thailand. Indeed, consistent with the average 
tariff data in Table 5, they had not been recouped as late as 1992 in much of the developing 
world, and in particular in Latin America and India (where they had not even been recouped by 
1998). 
 However, as stressed in the introduction, trade shares may vary because of shifts in 
export supply or import demand, rather than reflecting changes in international commodity 
market integration. In addition, the merchandise share of GDP has been shrinking since 1913, 
which would tend to pull down the share of merchandise exports in GDP, irrespective of 
globalization trends. As Robert Feenstra (1998), among others, has pointed out, the growth in 
merchandise trade has been far more impressive relative to merchandise value added than relative 
to GDP (although even his Table 2, which gives data for advanced countries only, shows 
Japanese and UK ratios lower in 1990 than in 1913). And other more qualitative criteria, such as 
the amount of intra-firm trade, associated with outsourcing and what Feenstra calls ‘disintegration 
of production’, also clearly demarcate the present era from the period before World War 1.  
 However, on other criteria the contribution of commodity market integration during the 
20th century does not seem so impressive. Baier and Bergstrand (2001) report that income growth 
explains fully two-thirds of world trade growth between the late 1950s and the late 1980s, leaving 
only 25% to tariff reductions, and a mere 8% to transport costs declines. Strikingly, the share of 
trade growth due to income growth during the late 20th century is very similar to that during the 
three centuries following Columbus– a period for which there is little or no evidence of 
commodity market integration (O’Rourke and Williamson 2001). Whether a much larger share of 
trade growth in the rapidly globalizing 19th century was due to commodity market integration is 
not known yet. 
 Price gaps for identical commodities in different markets remain the best measure of 
commodity market integration; and yet surprisingly little work has been done collecting such 
evidence for the 20th century. Presumably the post-1945 trade liberalization documented above 
has swamped any increases in ocean freight rates, and the result has been price convergence: but 
this remains purely speculative.21 Of course, documenting price convergence requires laborious 
                                                          
21 Indeed, obvious international sources of price data (e.g. the commodity price data to be found in the 
World Bank Development Indicators or the IMF’s International Financial Statistics) reveal no discernable 
general trend towards commodity price convergence during the past four decades. 
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work in the archives, ensuring that price quotes are for identical goods in various markets; but if 
the 19th century can yield such evidence for economic historians, then surely the 20th century can 
do the same? 
 Finally, what has happened to the composition of trade over the course of the 20th 
century? Table 7 gives the World Bank’s estimates of the shares of primary and manufactured 
goods in the various regions’ exports and imports. Recall that in 1913, primary products had 
accounted for between 62 and 64 percent of total merchandise exports, with food accounting for 
27%, agricultural raw materials for 22.7% and minerals for 14%. By 1999, the share of primary 
products in merchandise exports had declined to 18%, with the shares of food, agricultural raw 
materials and minerals (including fuel) accounting for a mere 8%, 2% and 8% respectively of the 
total. The impact of Third World industrialization comes across clearly from these figures: 
manufactures now account for more than half of merchandise exports everywhere bar the Middle 
East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. Even in the case of Africa, however, 
manufactures are now vastly more important than they were on the eve of World War I (compare 
with Table 4).22 
 
Section 7. Conclusions 
 There are several themes which have emerged from this survey. The range of goods 
which have been traded between continents since the Voyages of Discovery has steadily 
increased over time, and there has been substantial commodity market integration over the period, 
driven by technology in the 19th century and politics in the late 20th century. However, this trend 
towards greater market integration was not monotonic; it was periodically interrupted by shocks 
such as wars and world depressions, or by endogenous political responses to the distributional 
effects of globalization itself. In some periods politics has reinforced the effects of technology, 
while in other periods it has offset them. In several cases, severe shocks have had long-run effects 
on the international integration of commodity markets, as a result of politically induced 
hysteresis. Finally, we know remarkably little about international commodity market integration 
during the 20th century. 
 
                                                          
22 Table 7 also indicates the importance of trade in commercial services, which accounted for 19% of total 
exports worldwide in 1999, and for between 10 and 20% of exports from all regions. In 1913, services had 
accounted for 22% of total exports from the UK; commercial service exports accounted for 27% of UK 
exports in 1999. For the US, the figures were 8% in 1913 and 27% in 1999 (Mitchell 1988; US Department 
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Table 1.  Composition of European overseas imports, 1513-1780 
 
Panel A. Imports from Asia to Lisbon, 1513-1610 (% by weight) 
1513-19 1523-31 1547-8 1587-8 1600-3 1608-10 
Pepper 80.0  84.0  89.0  68.0  65  69.0  
Other spices 18.4  15.6  9.6  11.6  16.2  10.9  
Indigo 0.0  0.0  0.0  8.4  4.4  7.7  
Textiles 0.2  0.0  0.0  10.5  12.2  7.8  
Misc. 1.4  0.4  1.4  1.5  2.2  4.6  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100  
Panel B. Imports of VOC into Europe, 1619-1780 (% by invoice value) 
1619-21 1648-50 1668-70 1698-1700 1738-40 1778-80 
Pepper 56.5  50.4  30.5  11.2  8.1  9  
Other spices 17.6  17.9  12.1  11.7  6.1  3.1  
Textiles 16.1  14.2  36.5  54.7  41.1  49.5  
Tea and coffee    4.2  32.2  27.2  
Drugs, perfumes and dye-stuffs 9.8  8.5  5.8  8.3  2.8  1.8  
Sugar  6.4  4.2  0.2  3.7  0.6  
Saltpetre  2.1  5.1  3.9  2.6  4.4  
Metals 0.1  0.5  5.7  5.3  1.1  2.7  
Misc.  0.2  0.1  0.4  2.3  1.7  
Total 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100  
Panel C. Imports of English East India Company into Europe, 1668-1760 (% of invoice value) 
1668-70 1698-1700 1738-40 1758-60  
Pepper 25.25  7.02  3.37  4.37  
Textiles 56.61  73.98  69.58  53.51  
Raw silk 0.6  7.09  10.89  12.27  
Tea  0.03  1.13  10.22  25.23  
Coffee 0.44  1.93  2.65   
Indigo 4.25  2.82    
Saltpetre 7.67  1.51  1.85  2.97  
Misc. 5.15  4.52  1.44  1.65  
Total 100  100  100  100  
Panel D. Estimated annual sales of colonial imports, England and Netherlands, 1751-4 
Total sales (1000 pesos) Percentage of sales 
  From Asia Of total 
Textiles 6750  41.7  21.1  
Pepper 1100  6.8  3.4  
Tea  2800  17.3  8.7  
Coffee 1000  6.2  3.1  
Spices 1850  11.4  5.8  
Misc. 2700  16.7  8.4  
Total from Asia 16200  100.0  50.5  
  From America Of total 
Sugar 8050  50.8  25.1  
Tobacco 3700  23.3  11.5  
Misc. 4100  25.9  12.8  
Total from America 15850  100.0  49.5  
     
Total overseas imports 32050   100.0  
 
Sources: Prakesh (1998), pp. 36, 115, 120; Steensgaard (1995), p.12. 
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 (Tonnes) (Tonnes) (% of American
production) 
(Tonnes) (% of European
 imports) 
(Tonnes) (% of American 
production) 
1501-1525 45  40  88.9      
1526-1550 125  105  84.0      
1551-1575 240  205  85.4      
1575-1600 290  205  70.7    2.4  0.8  
1601-1625 340  245  72.1  100  40.8  17  5.0  
1626-1650 395  290  73.4  125  43.1  16  4.1  
1651-1675 445  330  74.2  130  39.4  6  1.3  
1676-1700 500  370  74.0  155  41.9  15  3  
1701-1725 550  415  75.5  190  45.8  15  2.7  
1726-1750 650  500  76.9  210  42  15  2.3  
1751-1775 820  590  72  215  36.4  15  1.8  
1776-1800 940  600  63.8  195  32.5  20  2.1  
 
 
Source: Barrett (1990), Tables 7.3, 7.6. 
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Table 3. Merchandise exports as a share of GDP (percent) 
 
 
Country 1820  1870  1913 1929 1950 1973  1992 1998 
France 1.3  4.9  7.8  8.6  7.6  15.2  22.9  28.7 
Germany na 9.5  16.1  12.8  6.2  23.8  32.6  38.9 
Netherlands na 17.4  17.3  17.2  12.2 40.7  55.3  61.2 
UK 3.1  12.2  17.5 13.3  11.3 14.0  21.4  25.0 
Total Western Europe na 10.0  16.3  13.3  9.4  20.9  29.7  na 
Spain 1.1  3.8  8.1  5.0  3.0  5.0  13.4  23.5 
USSR/Russia na na 2.9  1.6  1.3  3.8  5.1  10.6 
Australia na 7.1  12.3  11.2  8.8  11.0  16.9  18.1 
Canada na 12.0  12.2  15.8  13.0 19.9  27.2  na 
USA 2.0  2.5  3.7  3.6  3.0  4.9  8.2  10.1 
Argentina na 9.4  6.8  6.1  2.4  2.1  4.3  7.0 
Brazil na 12.2  9.8  6.9  3.9  2.5  4.7  5.4 
Mexico na 3.9  9.1  12.5  3.0  1.9  6.4  10.7 
Total Latin America na 9.0  9.5  9.7  6.2  4.6  6.2  na 
China na 0.7  1.7  1.8  2.6  1.5  2.3  4.9 
India na 2.6  4.6  3.7  2.9  2.0  1.7  2.4 
Indonesia na 0.9  2.2  3.6  3.4  5.1  7.4  9.0 
Japan na 0.2  2.4  3.5  2.2  7.7  12.4  13.4 
Korea 0.0  0.0  1.2  4.5  0.7  8.2  17.8  36.3 
Taiwan -- -- 2.5  5.2  2.5  10.2  34.4  na 
Thailand na 2.2  6.8  6.6  7.0  4.1  11.4  13.1 
Total Asia na 1.3  2.6  2.8  2.3  4.4  7.2  na 
World 1.0  4.6  7.9  9.0  5.5  10.5  13.5  17.2 
 
Source: Maddison (1995, p. 38). These have been updated for some countries using Maddison 
(2001, p.363); and for other countries using the raw export and GDP data given in Maddison 








Region Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
USA and
Canada 
600  330  270  2101  1542  559  
UK 117  1362  -1245  760  2596  -1836  
NW Europe 840  1800  -960  3064  5894  -2830  
Other Europe 750  515  235  1793  1689  104  
Oceania 1413  575  838  455  129  326  
Latin America  1531  595  936  
Africa  680  307  373  
Asia  1792  949  843  
Total 3720  4582  -862  12176  13701  -1525  
Manufactures 
1876-80 1913 
Region Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
USA and
Canada 
100  190  -90  734  891  -157  
UK 865  225  640  1751  601  1150  
NW Europe 1080  450  630  3318  1795  1523  
Other Europe 210  330  -120  578  1133  -555  
Oceania 35  1285  -1250  9  370  -361  
Latin America  51  879  -828  
Africa  26  451  -425  
Asia  461  1247  -786  
Total 2290  2480  -190  6928  7367  -439  
 
Source: P. Lamartine Yates (1959). 
 
 






Table 5. Average tariffs on manufactured goods, selected countries, 1913-1998 
 
1913  1931  1950  1980  1998/99 
Austria 18  24  18  14.6  NA 
Belgium 9  14  11  NA NA 
Denmark 14  – 3  NA NA 
France 20  30  18  NA NA 
Germany 13  21  26  NA NA 
Italy 18  46  25  NA NA 
Netherlands 4  -- 11  NA NA 
Spain 41  63  -- 8.3  NA 
Sweden 20  21  9  6.2  NA 
UK 0  -- 23  NA NA 
EU NA NA NA 8.3  4.1  
Russia 84  ** ** ** 13.4a  
Switzerland 9  19  -- 3.3  3.2b 
Australia 16  -- -- -- 6  
Canada 26  -- -- -- 4.9  
Japan 25-30 -- -- 9.9  5.5  
New 
Zealand 
15-20 -- -- -- 4.4  
USA 44  48  14  7  4.5  
Argentina 28  -- -- -- 14  
Brazil 50-70 -- -- -- 15.2  
Colombia 40-60 -- -- -- 11.4  
Mexico 40-50 -- -- -- 12.6  
China 4-5 -- -- -- 17.4  
India approx. 5 -- -- -- 34.2 
Iran 3-4 -- -- -- -- 
Thailand 2-3 -- -- -- 47.2c 
Turkey 5-10 -- -- -- 0.25 
 
 
Sources: Bairoch (1989; 1993); World Development Indicators 2000. 
 
Notes: NA = not applicable; – = not available; ** refers to the fact that the USSR ran such a 
restrictive trade policy that average tariffs were irrelevant; a = 1997; b = 1996; c = 1993. 
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Table 6. Average tariffs on manufactured goods, DCS, 1980-1993 
 
 
Region 1980-83 1984-87 1988-90 1991-93 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
23.6 25.1 22.7 12.5 
East Asia 21.6 18.1 18 17.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 32.8 23.5 22.5 -- 
 
     
Source: Rodrik (1999), based on UNCTAD (1994). 
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 Percent of merchandise exports Percent of total exports 
Region Food Ag. Raw 
materials 
Fuels Ores and 
metals 
Primary Manufactures Primary Manufactures Services 
East Asia and Pacific 7  2  5  2  16  81  14  73  13  
Europe and Central Asia 6  3  20  7  36  56  31  48  21  
Latin America and Carib. 24  3  17  6  50  51  44  44  12  
Middle East and N. Africa 4  1  73  1  79  21  67  18  15  
South Asia 16  2  0  2  20  79  16  63  21  
Sub-Saharan Africa 15  4  29  14  62  39  55  35  11  
High Income 7  2  3  2  14  82  12  68  20  
World 8  2  5  3  18  82  15  66  19  
 Percent of merchandise imports Percent of total imports 
Region Food Ag. Raw 
materials 
Fuels Ores and 
metals 
Primary Manufactures Primary Manufactures Services 
East Asia and Pacific 5  3  10  5  23  74  19  63  18  
Europe and Central Asia 10  2  7  3  22  67  21  63  16  
Latin America and Carib. 9  2  7  2  20  80  17  69  14  
Middle East and N. Africa          
South Asia 12  4  18  5  39  56  33  47  21  
Sub-Saharan Africa 11  2  10  2  25  71  22  63  15  
High Income 8  2  7  3  20  77  17  64  19  
World 8  2  7  3  20  76  17  65  18  
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2001.  
Note: the sum of primary and manufactured trade may not sum to 100 because of unclassified trade.  
